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Book publishing executive and motivational speaker Michael Hyatt uses historical characters and events as examples for character-building modern life-lessons.

War is one of life's crucibles -- a dangerous time of testing where opponents contest for blood and treasure. National interests and strategic objectives often get forgotten in the fog of battle. These desperate struggles of kill or be killed, winner take all, summon every human quality - especially those that expose strength or frailty. These days, even Harvard Business School uses the lessons gleaned from men in battle as case studies for their scholars bound for corporate boards.

The grizzled Marines of Merritt Edson's 1st Raider Battalion who endured the horrors of Hill 123, Edson's (Bloody) Ridge, Guadalcanal, in September, 1942, would guffaw at the idea of a business school teaching future CEOs decision-making strategy from the killing fields of war. Not even a dramatic Dow Jones sell-off induces the renown thousand-yard stare that the Marines of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 3rd Marines had after withstanding 77 days of siege by the North Vietnamese. Even so, the crucible of battle forces leaders to react under pressure and to adjust to rapidly changing situations.

Having clear objectives and developing viable options for achieving them is a common-shared charge of commanders, CEOs and anyone else who manages an organization. The dynamics of effective decision-making are transferable regardless of whether the consequences are dire or not.

Michael Hyatt, chairman of Thomas Nelson Publishing House, gives leadership seminars in addition to running the country's largest Christian press. One of Hyatt's leadership initiatives used Union General George B. McClellan and the failed 1862 Peninsula Campaign as the basis for a fascinating lecture he entitled, "Five Flaws of Weak Leaders." You may recall that Lincoln placed Gen. George B. McClellan in command of a superbly equipped army of a 100,000 men and he ordered that any war materiel that McClellan requested be supplied to him. Yet, the overly-cautious McClellan was continuously outmaneuvered by Robert E. Lee, his opponent.

Since General McClellan can't defend himself from the grave, and since Michael Hyatt comes to "bury Caesar and not to praise him," it's only proper to clarify that McClellan bore the promise of a fine commanding general in the early days of the war. During the hot summer of 1861, the general they called "Little Mac" defeated the Rebs under Porterfield at the Battle of Philippi and those under Pegram at Rich Mountain - both in western Virginia. And since McClellan was a decorated veteran of the Mexican War and had seen service in the Indian campaigns, Lincoln had reason to be optimistic. McClellan's command papers reveal a methodical, calculating strategist who sought to strike one decisive knock-out blow that'd end the war quickly. And he wished to do so with a minimum of casualties. In many ways, he was the complete opposite of Ulysses S. Grant, the general who eventually brought the war to a conclusion.

For his part, Michael Hyatt utilizes Doris Kearns Goodwin's Pulitizer prize-winning book "Team of Rivals" (Simon and Schuster, 2005) as a source for his insight into the psyche of both Lincoln and McClellan. Hyatt just as easily could have drawn a character study of Lincoln's strategy process as he did of General McClellan's; however, it is the latter who bungles a fabulous opportunity to save the Union with one deft and fatal blow. It is Lincoln's lot to salvage the campaign in the wake of the overly cautious McClellan.

McClellan was relieved of command after being outmaneuvered by Confederate generals Johnston and G.W. Smith around Richmond in the Battle of Seven Pines. Though technically the Union won the battle, it was a pyrrhic victory as the Southern forces achieved most of their objectives. In Michael Hyatt's leadership assessment, point number one to take to heart from this wartime situation is "hesitating to take definitive action." Remember the ancient proverb, "He who hesitates is lost?" McClellan had prepared his finely equipped army for many weeks to seize this moment and to make the most of it militarily. Ultimately, the battle came down to which side blundered the fewer times. From Lincoln's point of view, McClellan had numerical superiority plus he had a flotilla of gun boats on the James and York rivers to seal off the area.

Leadership flaws numbers two and three that Hyatt gleans from Doris Goodwin's book have to do with complaining about a lack of resources and then refusing to accept responsibility. These traits are odious in a subordinate and inexcusable for a general - or executive. Lincoln provided McClellan with the most powerful military force ever mustered on these shores.

When objectives were unmet, McClellan placed the blame on everyone but himself. Everyone from generals to politicians to coaches and CEOs needs to heed harry Truman's maxim, "The buck stops here." It's a given that the public will quickly know who dropped the ball, and by taking responsibility, the commander gains statue - even in defeat. Yet, McClellan was a proud man, and he had contempt for Lincoln's corn pone ways.

Six weeks before First Manassas, in June 1861, a bold George McClellan caught Confederate Colonel George A. Porterfield and his regiment sleeping near Philippi crossroads in western Virginia. The rout of the southern boys was so complete that the Northern press dubbed the engagement the "Philippi Races," and hopeful Unionists began calling McClellan "Little Napoleon." It's likely that George McClellan, a student of Napoleonic tactics, saw his Virginia peninsula campaign as a stage where he might recreate Napoleon's grand Battle of Austerlitz (1805), or "Battle of the Nations."

At Austerlitz Napoleon, the man admirers called "the Little Corporal," defeated the combined armies of Russia, Austria, Britain, and Portugal. His opponents had almost double the number of soldiers; however, the brilliant little Frenchman dazzled his foes. McClellan was no Napoleon, and more significantly, McClellan's subalterns - Sykes, Sumner, Heintzelman, Reynolds and Keyes were nowhere near the equal to Napoleon's field marshals - Murat, Ney, Vandamme, Bernadotte and Lannes. The message here is clear: the quality of the subalterns is every bit as essential as the quality of the commander.

Michael Hyatt labels McClellan as one who abused the privileges of leadership. Even though his men adored him, "Little Mac" lived in grand mansions while his soldiers roughed it on the hard, cold ground. That privilege worked for Europeans for centuries of war on the Continent, but Americans saw things differently in the 1860s. Hyatt writes that, "His extravagant lifestyle stood in stark contrast to his successor General Ulysses S. Grant, who often traveled with only a toothbrush."

The most damning criticism that Hyatt lifts from Goodwin's book deals with McClellan's acts of insubordination. The general often kept the President waiting, even for hours. He also referred to Lincoln in terms of Darwin's missing link, a gorilla - a cruel reference to Lincoln's ungainly gait. It goes without saying that if one agrees to take the pay and the assignment, he should also take the directives that come with it. McClellan was fortunate that Lincoln did not cashier him or have him incarcerated in the basement of the Capitol. Instead, Lincoln gained statue as a long-suffering and patient leader.

What Michael Hyatt has done is to seek character building lessons from the superabundance of American history books now in print. Hyatt's astute use of the Goodwin work illustrates best the words of Spanish philosopher George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to fulfill it."

(Dr. Thomas B. Horton is a history teacher at Porter-Gaud School. He lives in the Old Village).